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ABSTRACT
2Background 
DataSHIELD has been proposed to facilitate the co-analysis  of individual-level data from
multiple  studies  without  physically  sharing the data.  In a  previous  paper, we investigated
whether DataSHIELD could protect participant confidentiality in accordance with UK law. In
this follow-up paper, we investigate whether DataSHIELD can address a broader range of
ethics-related data sharing concerns.
Methods 
Ethics-related data sharing concerns of IRBs, ethics experts, international research consortia
and  research  participants  were  identified  through  a  literature  search  and  systematically
examined  at  a  multidisciplinary  workshop  to  determine  whether  DataSHIELD  proposes
mechanisms which can address these concerns. 
Results 
DataSHIELD  addresses  several  ethics-related  data  sharing  concerns  related  to  privacy,
confidentiality, and the protection of the research participant’s rights while sharing data and
after the data have been shared. The data remain entirely under the direct management of the
study that collected them. Data processing commands are strictly supervised and the data are
queried in a protected environment.  Issues related to the return of individual research results
when data are shared are eliminated as the responsibility for return remains at the study of
origin. 
Conclusion
3DataSHIELD  can  provide  an  innovative  and  robust  solution  for  addressing  commonly
encountered ethics-related data sharing concerns.
4INTRODUCTION
Vast amounts of data are needed to study the causes of disease and elucidate interactions
between genes and environment [1]. Building enriched datasets typically involves integrating
data from diverse sources,  including clinical care,  health registries and research data,  and
often includes transnational data sharing [2]. Such data sharing is increasingly demanded by
research  funders  as  a  way to  accelerate  scientific  discovery  and  maximize  the  economic
returns on research data [3-5]. Much of the data sharing that has taken place in international
consortia studying genetics and disease has occurred at the aggregate or summary-level for
the conduct of meta-analyses [6]. Sharing summary-level data offers more data security than
sharing individual-level data but does not offer the analytical flexibility and precision that can
be achieved when sharing individual-level data. For instance, summary statistics often fail to
convey all  of the information held in  the individual-level raw data  or may not suffice to
extend exploration of significant findings. In comparison, sharing individual-level data from
local study sites offers much greater analytical flexibility, and sometimes increased precision,
because the individual-level data can be pooled and analysed directly. However, it is ethically
more challenging because individual-level data may contain sensitive information about the
individual’s health, lifestyle, genotype or socio-demographic factors that potentially can be
used  to  identify  these  individuals  or  provide  extensive  insight  into  their  private  life.
Accordingly, mechanisms are typically put in place when sharing data to safeguard against re-
identification, prevent potential  data misuses and protect privacy and confidentiality. Such
mechanisms include both technical (e.g. data coding, password protected access, use of off-
site broker with key, limitations on publishable sample size) and administrative (e.g.  data
access agreements, confidentiality clauses) solutions [7]. However, they often place severe
limitations on data sharing, can require considerable administrative effort and do not always
5sufficiently  address  concerns  surrounding  data  sharing.  For  instance,  even  if  data  access
agreements are established for a data sharing collaboration, it can prove difficult to control
what happens with the data once they are transferred to another site [8-9].
It is will all these considerations in mind that our international team of researchers proposed
DataSHIELD (Data Aggregation Through Anonymous Summary-statistics from Harmonised
Individual  levEL Databases)  [10].  The  objective  of  DataSHIELD  is  to  facilitate  the  co-
analysis of data with all the benefits of individual-level analysis while recognising and finding
alternatives that address the major ethical concerns that usually accompany individual-level
data sharing. DataSHIELD is being developed by the Data to Knowledge (D2K) Research
Group  at  the  University  of  Bristol  under  the  umbrella  of  the  FP7  collaborative  project
BioSHaRE  (Biobank  Standardisation  and  Harmonisation  for  Research  Excellence  in  the
European Union) [11]. 
In  a  previous  paper,  we  investigated  whether  DataSHIELD  could  appropriately  protect
participant confidentiality according to UK legal standards [12]. The paper concludes that
DataSHIELD reaches UK standards of protection for the sharing of biomedical data, and calls
for  the  investigation  on  whether  DataSHIELD  can  satisfy  other  legal  and  ethics  review
requirements,  also  outside  of  the  UK.  In  this  follow-up  paper,  we  investigate  whether
DataSHIELD  can  address  a  broader  range  of  ethics-related  data  sharing  concerns  of
Institutional  Review  Boards  (IRBs),  ethics  experts,  international  research  consortia  and
research participants, independently on whether there are encountered in the UK or in other
countries. It should be noted that this second paper primarily focuses on ethics-related data
sharing concerns and does not encompass the analysis of legal requirements.  
What is DataSHIELD?
6DataSHIELD is an analytical tool that enables the co-analysis of individual-level data from
multiple studies or sources without physically transferring or sharing the data and without
providing any direct access to individual-level data [13-15]. DataSHIELD can be used to run
the same kind of analyses as with any other statistical tool. For instance, DataSHIELD can be
used  to  produce  a  table  showing  the  age  distribution  of  patients  in  several  studies  in
percentages; or to analyse variables providing information about age (x1) and smoking habit
(x2) with the objective to predict a risk of cancer outcome (y). The range of possible analyses
in DataSHIELD is outlined in the DataSHIELD wiki (16).
Figure 1 illustrates how the traditional analytical workflow is reversed under DataSHIELD.
Rather than bringing the data to the analyses, the analyses are brought to the data. Individual-
level data are never transferred away from the local study computers; parallel data analyses
commands are instead simultaneously brought to bear on the individual-level data at each
local site involved in the collaboration. Through iterative computational processing, the only
information that is transferred back and forth between the local sites holding their data and the
analysis  centre  are  the  analytical  commands  and  the  resultant  non-identifying  statistical
estimates and summary parameters generated from those commands.   
As described in Figure 2, DataSHIELD is primarily used for co-analysis of data when each
data source contains the same variables (e.g. age, sex, blood pressure) on different individuals
(this  is  called  horizontal  partitioning)  [17].  DataSHIELD is  also being developed for  co-
analysis of data when different data sources (e.g. a cohort study, a hospital record, a registry)
report different variables on the same individuals (this is called vertical partitioning). This
paper focuses solely on horizontal partitioning which has recently been implemented as an
open-source  software  application  and  is  therefore  likely  to  be  encountered  by  ethics
committees, IRBs and other governance boards. 
7What is needed to use DataSHIELD?
The  use  of  DataSHIELD  requires  the  establishment  of  a  specific  IT-environment  which
includes a central analysis computer, OPAL database servers [18], the open source software
for statistical computing R [19] and the DataSHIELD R packages [10]. Both Opal software
and DataSHIELD R packages are open source and freely available to the research community.
The  Opal  servers  are  installed  inside  the  firewall  at  the  local  study  sites  of  all  the
collaborating studies. Other requirements for co-analysis of data under DataSHIELD do not
differ  from  conventional  approaches  with  respect  to  preparatory  activities  and  include
checking that  governance stipulations  allow the data  to be used for  the specified project,
identifying the variables to use from the different studies, harmonising the measures to be
analysed and de-identifying the data to be shared from each of the local datasets. 
METHOD
In  August  2012,  we  organized  a  multidisciplinary  workshop  gathering  biostatisticians,
epidemiologists,  sociologists,  lawyers  and  ethicists,  all  involved  in  the  development  of
DataSHIELD and members of the BioSHaRE project [11]. Before the workshop, a literature
search was conducted in Pubmed, Google Scholar and Internet using the combination of the
search terms [data sharing] and [ethics] and/or [concerns] and/or [experiences] to identify
common ethics-related data sharing concerns of IRBs, ethics experts, international research
consortia and research participants. Based on the results from the literature search, a list of
commonly encountered ethics-related data sharing concerns was set up and distributed at the
workshop.  Then,  the  workshop  members  conducted  a  systematic  examination  of  these
concerns by identifying and describing the mechanisms in DataSHIELD that may or may not
address each of the concerns listed. The objective was to determine whether each concern: (i)
could be solved or ameliorated by DataSHIELD; (ii)  could be created or made worse by
8DataSHIELD; (iii) were independent of DataSHIELD, and so could not be ameliorated by
DataSHIELD, but equally was no more of a problem for DataSHIELD than for any other
form of data sharing or co-analysis. The discussions at the workshop also encompassed a
range of technical statistics/IT considerations, and legal, professional, and societal issues (e.g.
related to  the appropriate  identification of intellectual  property and contribution),  but  this
paper focuses solely on key issues from the perspective of ethical and governance boards.
RESULTS
1. Main ethics-related data sharing concerns
Our literature search revealed that ethics-related data sharing concerns are primarily related to
1)  the  protection  of  the  privacy  and  confidentiality  of  the  data,  2)  the  protection  of  the
research participants’ rights when data are shared, and 3) what may happen to the data after
they have been shared. These concerns are described below and summarized in Table 1.
Concerns related to the protection of the privacy and confidentiality of the data 
A major concern of IRB members [20-22], ethics experts [9, 23-28], members of international
research  consortia  [29-31]  and  research  participants  [32-36]  is  that  the  privacy  and
confidentiality of the data may be breached when the data are shared, potentially leading to
making the participants’ specific health risks public. For instance, datasets may accidentally
disclose  sensitive  information,  even  when  they have  been modified  to  include  only  non-
identifiable information, because external investigators are able to link the information in the
dataset with information in other publicly available datasets to re-identify individuals [37-39]
or because summary data may unexpectedly be found to convey more information that had
previously been believed [40-41]. Similarly, a researcher may deliberately violate the terms of
9the  informed  consent  and  share  sensitive  data  that  should  not  be  shared  with  other
investigators  outside  of  the  study  of  origin  [42].  The  security  of  the  data  can  also  be
jeopardized if the individual-level datasets are hacked or copied when physically transferred
to a central computing unit for analysis [43]. 
 
Concerns related to the protection of the research participants’ rights
Several concerns arise in data sharing collaborations regarding the protection of the research
participants’ rights. First, it is often difficult for researchers to know whether data sharing is
compatible with the terms of the original consent [29-31, 44]. This is primarily because many
consent forms, particularly those collected some decades ago do not explicitly mention data
sharing at  all  [45]. Second, it  is often difficult  for researchers to ensure that the research
participants’ right to withdraw from a study at “any time and without any conditions” (as
usually formulated in consents) and the right to require that personal data be deleted and
removed from the  research  databases  are  sufficiently  protected  when  the  data  are  shared
multiple  times  across  studies  and  managed  by  others  [44].  To address  this  issue  recent
versions of informed consents are often modified to explain that data cannot be withdrawn
and deleted once they have been physically distributed for analysis [46]. This approach may
seem to solve the  issue of  withdrawal  but  in  practice it  restricts  the individual’s right  to
withdraw as this right then only applies if the data are not shared. Third, it is often difficult for
researchers  to  know how to  handle  the  feedback  of  individual  research  results  produced
through  data  sharing  to  research  participants.  Although  the  issue  of  whether  individual
research  results,  in  particular  from genetic  and  genomic  research,  should  be  returned  to
research  participants  is  still  much debated,  several  contemporary  opinions  and guidelines
favour return of certain results under specific circumstances [47-51]. Providing such results
may not be problematic when the data are processed at the site of the study of origin but this
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can become much more complicated when the data are shared. Namely, which investigator is
responsible  for  returning  individual  research  results  to  participants:  the  researcher  of  the
original study or the researcher who actually generated the relevant results  having gained
access to the data at a later time point [51]? 
Post-data sharing concerns
Protecting the data and the research participants’ rights after the data have been shared is
another key concern. For instance, who is responsible for ensuring that data are appropriately
stored and curated into the future and who ensures that they are accessed only by those who
have proper authorization, if secondary access is awarded to a research group that is then
wound up,  for  example  because  its  leader  retires  [52].   Although codes  of  conduct  have
recently been proposed to help pave the way for a common set of data sharing principles
[53,54]  and  recommendations  have  been  forwarded  for  the  establishment  of  international
governance models when sharing data [55], there is currently no standard protocol to help
guide  the  allocation  of  complementary  governance  responsibilities  to  different  research
groups (for example, the original data generators and secondary users) or to indicate precisely
what these responsibilities may entail [44,56].
Properly  addressing  the  ethics-related  data  sharing  concerns  described  above  is  often
burdensome  and  difficult  for  researchers  who  have  certainly  not  sought  these  formal
responsibilities. For instance, the more the data are shared, the more difficult it becomes for
the investigator of the original study or the biobank which collected the data to monitor and
control how the data are handled by others and to properly assess potential risks related to the
sharing of those data. This is primarily because the level of risk is a function of the full data
environment -- the datasets and the available technologies -- and not just of the dataset alone
[9].  Furthermore,  having  full  control  regarding  the  fate  of  the  data  over  time  requires
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resources that are often non-existent or scarce [52]. For instance, research collaborations are
normally set up for a limited period of time. What happens to the data after the collaboration
has ended and how they are to be protected from potential misuses is rarely made explicit and
is often unclear [52]. 
2. How does the DataSHIELD approach address ethics-related data sharing concerns?
DataSHIELD has a number of characteristics that provide solutions to several of the ethics-
related data sharing concerns described above. Primarily four sets of mechanisms apply in
DataSHIELD to protect the privacy and confidentiality of the data. First, the individual level
data  are  never  physically  shared  or  transferred  but  are  instead  queried  locally.  This  has
positive implications for many of the concerns normally encountered when sharing data as
summarized  in  Table  1.  For  instance,  concerns  regarding  the  protection  of  the  research
participants’ right to withdraw data from shared datasets  become non-existent as the data
never leave the local study sites and can easily be removed or destroyed locally. This also
allows  the  local  sites  to  ensure  that  the  research  use  complies  with  existing  consents.
Similarly, returning individual research results to research participants is a non-issue under
DataSHIELD because co-analysis in DataSHIELD never produces explicit individual-level
research results. This is because, although the contribution of the data from each individual is
properly included in every analysis, that contribution is always merged with the equivalent
contributions of all of the other participants of that same study before the information driving
the  overall  analysis  is  transmitted from the study to  the  analysis  centre.  This  means that
individual results are invisible to the statistician coordinating the central analysis and cannot
even be inferred by anybody outside the original study itself. One may ask whether designing
a system that prevents the return of individual research results to participants is acceptable at a
time when such return is increasingly recommended by commentators [47-51]. However, the
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decision to use DataSHIELD implies that the return of results has been properly discussed
prior to analysis and that the research participants endorse the return policy that applies for
them. 
Second, each DataSHIELD command systematically goes through a 3-level validation process
to ensure that it does what it has been designed for and that potential disclosure risks are kept
to a minimum. Each command is internally checked and tested by a DataSHIELD developer
other than the one who wrote the command, then checked again by an external ‘expert’ not
involved  in  the  development  of  DataSHIELD,  and  finally  reviewed  by  the  DataSHIELD
Advisory  Board  which  discusses  whether  the  command  respects  the  privacy  and
confidentiality protecting principles of the DataSHIELD platform. The advisory board may
request that some changes are made to the command and takes the final decision of approving
or  rejecting  the  command.  Commands  or  sequences  of  commands  that  are  explicitly
disclosive are systematically blocked. In addition, special restrictions may be placed on the
nature  of  the  output  that  a  particular  DataSHIELD  command  can  return.  For  example,
contingency  table  analyses  can  only  produce  tables  which  contain  no  cells  with  counts
between  1  and  4,  and  where  necessary  these  limits  can  be  tailored  to  reflect  specific
legislation in the country of origin of the study. Similarly, when graphical representations are
used to display the relationship between two variables, heat map plots and contour plots are
used rather than standard point-by-point representations. This is because some such points
may be disclosive for certain individuals. If disclosure was to occur, the commands that are
responsible for the disclosure can be easily identified as all commands that are issued are
recorded and it  is  kept  track of  who actually  issued them. Any accidental  disclosure can
therefore lead to a suitable warning, and appropriate sanctions can be applied if deliberate
maleficence has occurred. 
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Third, DataSHIELD includes a number of mechanisms to protect the data from any potential
external  attack.  As  described  earlier,  the  use  of  DataSHIELD  involves  an  internet
communication between the central analysis computer and the study’s Opal servers. Using the
internet to exchange data always involves some level of risk and it is impossible to guarantee
that no one will, at some point in time, attempt to compromise the security of the data. 
To minimize risks, DataSHIELD follows best practice by ensuring that the operating system
and software are secure and kept up-to-date to address new and emerging threats [57-58]. In
addition, all communication across the internet between the study computers and the analysis
centre is encrypted and secured.  For instance, web services are accessed through Hypertext
Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) and Opal systematically checks the  digital signatures of
any user [59]. IP address filtering can be configured in the study’s firewalls to prevent any
other computer than the allowed central analysis one to connect to the Opal servers. Even if
someone was to  hack in  and decrypt  the data traffic flowing back and forth between the
analysis centre and the local studies, that traffic is deliberately non-disclosive: this being the
fundamental basis of DataSHIELD [14]. 
In some cases, although the main database of a given study may be too sensitive to allow any
risk of  access via  the internet,  the subset  of data  required for  a  particular  analysis  under
DataSHIELD may not demand such stringent isolation. In such cases, it is possible to place
the data to be used in the analysis in a separate database still located behind the firewall of the
study. It should however be noted that in cases where the absolute security of the data is of
utmost importance then the best practice for data of this kind is for it to be inaccessible from
the internet, in which case DataSHIELD is not an appropriate tool to use. 
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Finally, DataSHIELD is an open source tool. It can be examined and audited by any potential
user  who can contribute to its future improvement, which means that no one has to take on
trust claims that its operations are secure: users can check for themselves.
DISCUSSION
The main ethics-related data  sharing concerns  relate  to  the  protection  of  the privacy and
confidentiality of the data and the protection of the research participants’ rights both while the
data are being shared and after the data sharing has taken place. These results are corroborated
by  findings  from and  a  video  ethnography  (observation)  study of  an  early  DataSHIELD
development workshop [15]. In this study, the centrality of concerns about the maintenance of
privacy and confidentiality for individual-level data by DataSHIELD developers and would-
be users was demonstrated. 
Our analysis  reveals  that  many of  the most  common ethics-related  data  sharing  concerns
become non-issues  or  are  greatly  alleviated  under  DataSHIELD.  Concerns  related  to  the
protection  of  the  research  participants’  rights  are  eliminated  because  the  data  are  never
physically shared and therefore remain entirely under the direct management of the study that
collected them. Concern related to the protection of the privacy and confidentiality of the data
is minimized as the data are never physically accessed by others and key security features are
built  into DataSHIELD to reduce disclosure risks.  This may significantly change the way
cross-study analyses are conducted in research collaborations and facilitate the conduct of
research projects which otherwise would be difficult to realize due to privacy and security
concerns. As an illustration, researchers often need to pool data from diverse sources, for
instance  medical  records,  to  conduct  research  investigating  the  aetiology  of  disease  or
mechanisms underlying side effects of medical treatments [60]. Such research is of high value
for public health but is often difficult to realize because of the sensitivity of the data held in
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medical records. DataSHIELD may provide a useful solution to conduct such research as risks
of breaching patient confidentiality by using DataSHIELD, although not entirely eradicated,
would be reduced to an “absolute and acceptable minimum” [60]. 
DataSHIELD may also facilitate the sharing of data that otherwise would not be shared due to
intellectual property concerns as it  allows for the sharing of information held in the data
without having to physically transfer or share the data themselves [60]. Finally, DataSHIELD
may facilitate the conduct of research projects which normally are too difficult to realize due
to technical constraints. For instance, while data sharing often requires lots of computational
capacity when large data files are transferred to a central computer for analysis, such capacity
is not needed in DataSHIELD since the data files remain on local study sites and it is only the
non-disclosive summary statistics that are passed between studies and the analysis centre, and
these are generally very small. The use of DataSHIELD may also improve the quality of co-
analysis. Study sites participating in a standard collaboration, for instance conventional meta-
analysis, are normally required to run statistical analysis of similar quality and design. This
can be difficult  to  coordinate  and police when datasets  from numerous sites  are  used.  In
DataSHIELD,  the  same  data  analysis  commands  are  sent  to  all  local  study  computers
simultaneously. Variations in command quality or design are therefore never encountered.
As  explained  earlier,  DataSHIELD  cannot  be  used  in  research  projects  which  require
producing disclosive summaries (such as point-by-point representations in scatter plots) as
such features  are  blocked in  DataSHIELD to protect  the  confidentiality  of  the  data  [60].
However, alternative solutions can be provided, for instance graphical representations without
individual data points such as contour plots [60]. 
A central question is whether analysis in DataSHIELD still qualifies as data sharing per se
since the individual-level data are never physically shared but queried at local study sites and
only summary statistics are  shared.  In our previous paper  led by Susan Wallace [12],  we
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suggested that the summary statistics processed in DataSHIELD are anonymous data which
could  potentially  be  shared  without  referral  to  European  data  protection  principles,  thus
opening  for  pan-European  use  of  the  data.  A  similar  analysis  could  indicate  whether
DataSHIELD  can  cross  internal  national  borders  (i.e.  US  state  or  Canadian  provincial
borders) or international borders. Current practice is that researchers normally do not share
individual level data if the consent of the study of origin does not allow for such sharing or
does not specifically mention the possibility of data sharing. Such practice is legitimate but
limits  the  possibilities  of  retrospective  research  when  the  consents  do  not  mention  data
sharing. It can reasonably be argued that the analytical process in DataSHIELD should be
considered  to  be  equivalent  to  meta-level  analysis  using  summary  level  data  (which  is
normally the standard data sharing practice when the informed consent does not mention or
authorise data sharing). However, technological approaches should not be used as a way of
circumventing informed consent.  Therefore further research is needed to determine whether
IRBs and research participants would be comfortable with the use of DataSHIELD in the
absence of explicit consent but with the approval of ethics and scientific review bodies. 
As an entirely new approach to the joint analysis of data from several studies, DataSHIELD
offers some potentially exciting opportunities. We encourage members of IRBs and ethics
committees to consider and discuss whether the use of DataSHIELD is consistent with the
original intents for use of data as framed in the informed consents of the studies they manage.
Similarly, we encourage researchers  to consider whether  the use of DataSHIELD may be




Multiple  site  individual-level  data  analysis  is  increasingly  needed  to  accelerate  research
discovery but encounters a number of ethical challenges. DataSHIELD offers a new approach
to data sharing and is currently being tested in real-life epidemiological projects, including the
Healthy Obese Project of the BioSHaRE project [11]. In our previous paper led by Susan
Wallace  [12],  we  concluded  that  DataSHIELD was  in  compliance  with  UK standards  of
protection for the sharing of biomedical data. This new paper demonstrates that DataSHIELD
can also address a number of commonly encountered ethics-related data sharing concerns.
New commands are being developed in DataSHIELD to address the needs of a variety of
collaborations.  Further  work  is  needed to  investigate  whether  the  use  of  DataSHIELD is
compliant with legal requirements in countries other than the UK. 
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Table 1 – Budin-Ljøsne et al: Common ethics-related data sharing concerns and how 
they are addressed by DataSHIELD
Data sharing concerns How they are usually addressed How they are addressed in DataSHIELD 
Protection of the privacy and confidentiality of the data 
Breaches of privacy and 
confidentiality of the data 
 Technical mechanisms (e.g. data coding, 
password protected access, use of off-site 
broker with key, limitations on publishable 
sample size) 
 Administrative mechanisms (e.g. data access 
agreements, confidentiality clauses)
In addition to standard technical and 
administrative mechanisms:
 Individual-level data never physically shared 
with researchers outside of the study of 
origin 
 3-level testing of commands for risks of 
disclosure
 Output restrictions to impede return of 
possibly identifiable results
 New subject’s identifiers automatically 
generated by Opal. Original subject’s 
identifiers assigned by studies never 
exposed and stored securely in a distinct 
database in Opal
Risk of residual or inferential 
disclosure 
 Standard statistical disclosure methodologies  Standard statistical disclosure methodologies
 Any disclosure can be easily identified, 
investigated and managed 
Risk of hacking in via a portal to 
the internet
 No standard solution. If the absolute security 
of a given data set is of utmost importance 
then best practice is for it to be inaccessible 
from the internet.
 Moving the data for the DataSHIELD analysis
to a separate database behind the study’s 
firewall and using DataSHIELD via an Opal
server 
Protection of the research participants’ rights
Data sharing according to the 
terms of the original consent
 Necessary ethico-legal and data access 
approvals required
 Necessary ethico-legal and data access 
approvals required
Complexity of guaranteeing the 
right to withdraw data from 
shared datasets
 Clause in informed consent that the data 
cannot be withdrawn once they are shared
 Individual-level data never shared, can 
therefore be withdrawn/deleted locally
Complexity of returning 
individual results to research 
participants
 Variety of policies: from no return of results to
some return of validated clinically useful 
results
 Individual research results are never produced,
so no results to return. The exploration, 
identification and return of potentially 
relevant individual-level results remain sole 
responsibility of the local study that 
originally collected the data.
Post-data sharing concerns
Complexity of protecting the data 
and the research participants’ 
rights once the data have been 
shared
 No standard solution  Individual-level data are never physically 
shared. All aspects of the ongoing 
management of data and research 
participants’ rights in relation to those data 
remain with the local study. 
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Figure 1 – Budin-Ljøsne et al. 
DataSHIELD analytical flow
Figure 2 – Budin-Ljøsne et al. 
Horizontal versus vertical partitioning
